James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

8-23-2007

DDASaccident562
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident562" (2007). Global CWD Repository. 761.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/761

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/02/2008

Accident number: 562

Accident time: 10:26

Accident Date: 23/08/2007

Where it occurred: Task No: 6-015, DA
CBU No. 585, Near
Najdh

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 25/08/2007

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMAS

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: DPICM M77
submunition

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
leaf litter
rocks/stones
trees
Date last modified: 08/02/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM:
725,380.3689205

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
incomplete detonation (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
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Accident report
Limited details of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files
and pictures. Their conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has
been lost. The substance of the available date is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The
original files are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. This record will be amended if a full
accident report is made available later.

Internal accident data
[This data is gathered from a detailed Annex to the Internal Accident report. Unfortuantely the
accident report has not yet been made available.]

Tasking order
Date: 14th May 2007
To: [Name removed] TOM [International demining NGO]
From: [Name removed] Chief of Plans, MACC SL
CC: [Name removed] Chief of Operations, MACC SL; [Name removed] LAF Ops Officer
Subject: Parameters for Cluster Strike Survey in Area 6
Location: Area-6
Requirement: (Will be amended as required)
It has been recognised that a Survey requirement (Team) is needed to facilitate a more rapid
review and on the ground analysis of the actual contamination within the specified Cluster
strikes in Area 6.
The Survey team will be directed to identify the centre of the strike where possible, fence the
immediate area and take the UTM and distance for bearing. These areas need only at this
stage require box of four (4) it will also be necessary to also take photos of the area of
concern.
Once these are done on each target area, it will allow subsequent BAC teams to be deployed
directly into the threat area making the clearance more efficient and effective.
Documentation
[International demining NGO] have documentation that will fulfil the requirement for the survey
process, these will be filled in by the Survey Supervisor and presented to the [International
demining NGO] TOM for review and then passed on to the Chief of Plans MACC SL.
Both digital and hardcopy is required, these will be entered into IMSMA as additional
information.
On a weekly (Friday) basis the [International demining NGO] TOM will receive documentation
ie:
Spreadsheet
IMSMA maps both imagery and UNIFIL
DA reports as needed and
LAF Reports (New targets) these were previously visited by [Other demining groups] EOD
teams, I will attach also their findings.
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Recommendations that current IMSMA and GIS issued to your organisation be utilised to
further enhance information requirements.
Cancellations
If any task is deemed that no threat exists or the actual damage was caused by other means,
then the Cancellation Process is to be used, as per the NTSG. These are to be filled in by the
CLO and submitted to the [International demining NGO] TOM for review and passed to the
Chief of Plans MACC SL.
Cluster Clearance
No clearance of cluster bombs is to take place unless they constitute an immediate threat to
the community.
If cluster bombs are required to be removed/destroyed then a detailed search of the area is to
be conducted and records kept detailing the type of munition, the quantity cleared, their
location (by UTM).
Only qualified EOD personnel are required to destroy these items, if [International demining
NGO] cannot destroy these items the MACC SL Chief of Plans will deploy a qualified EOD
team if required.
Demolitions
All activities that involve any demolitions is to be per SOP and that these demolitions are to
be reported to the MACC SL radio room at least 30mins prior to any action taken.
Any changes to these requirements are to be approved by the UNMACC SL before
implementation.
Signed: Chief of Plans UNMACC SL; LAF Ops Officer, MACC SL/NDO
Accepted by organisation: TOM [International demining NGO].

From Annex A
[the only part of the report made available]
Task No: 6-015, RECCE 1: DA CBU No. 585
GR: 725,380.3689205
Start date 22/08/07
Nearest hospital: Najdh, 20km and 25 minutes away.
Clearance methodology: Technical Survey
BAC Team: RECCE 1
Last casevac exercise: 22-8-07
Date of last external QA: 22-9-07
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Time of accident: 10:26
Location of accident: CBU 585
GR: 725380,3689205
Time of evacuation: 10:35
[Approx CASEVAC time: 34 minutes]
From photo story
[The victim was handling a device when the accident occurred. Another “gagged” device was
close by.]

[The M77 partially detonated in the Victim’s hand, but the main charge did not explode. The
picture below shows the device afterwards, with the firing pin and ribbon separated.]
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[The copper cone of the shaped charge inside the M77 was visible at one end, and the high
explosive fill at the other.]

[The Victim’s right hand was injured.]

[Pictures of the site and the prodding tools showed that clearance was being conducted, but
there was no indication of any detectors that would have allowed sub-surface clearance.]

[Pictures of another disarmed M77 showed that this was not a non-intrusive survey. Technical
Survey is usually intrusive, but the tasking order form the MAC into the order that “No”
clearance be conducted - and this was stressed in Bold.]
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[Pictures of the Victim’s PPE showed an undamaged visor and a short frag-jacket with blood
stains.]
[Pictures of the investigators at work showed that they did not wear PPE.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 735

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 34 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Long vior

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The instructions from the MACC SL were ambiguous and open to interpretation. The
instructions stressed that “NO” clearance was to be conducted, but the task was Technical
Survey, which generally involves making investigative lanes into a suspect area. This appears
to have been done visually.
It is possible to see whether an exposed M77 has armed, and it is routine for many demining
groups to “gag” unarmed items so that they cannot “arm”, and then destroy them later.
The M77 involved in this accident did not detonate properly and may have been damaged. If
this was visible, it would imply that the Victim made an error by touching it. But if the damage
was not visible, the Victim was just extremely lucky.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the Victim
may have been operating as instructed and the accident occurred due to a device that was
damaged and unstable, but not obviously so.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because the Victim may have
been exceeding his brief by the removal of multiple items that did not present an immediate
risk to civilians. The removal of some easy to locate devices is sometimes called “cherry-
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picking” and frowned upon because there is often a “footprint” from a cluster munition strike –
and the removal of devices can erase the footprint and mean that a far wider area has to be
cleared later.
The failure of the demining group’s investigators to wear PPE at the site is common, but sets
a bad example.
This record will be updated if more information becomes available later.
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